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In Art and Ethics in a Material World: Kant’s Pragmatist Legacy Jennifer A.
McMahon argues for a pragmatist interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s work, focusing on the ﬁrst part of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment – the Critique of
Aesthetic Judgment. The book draws attention to the importance of community in
forming aesthetic judgments and in forming the capacity for moral judgment.
McMahon’s project is a metaethical inquiry in the nature of moral reﬂection.
The book is divided into eight chapters. Each chapter explores a concept related
to artistic or moral deliberation, appealing to several artistic works to illustrate
features of judgment, reason and the understanding necessary for moral agency.
The ﬁrst chapter – an introduction – lays the groundwork for the text, using a
discussion of art to demonstrate a feature of human cognition that is a prerequisite
for morality. Chapter 2 explores the processes involved in the creation and
reception of art. In Chapter 3, McMahon argues that community membership is a
prequisite for moral deliberation. Chapter 4 examines the role and nature of reason.
The next two chapters lay out the author’s foundation for morality, with Chapter
5 exploring the communal nature of morality. Here, McMahon builds upon the work
of Jürgen Habermas, itself a furthering of themes of Kant’s Critique of the Power of
Judgment. Chapter 6 explores the role imagination plays in understanding. Chapter
7 discusses the nature of genius. In the concluding chapter, the author compares the
theory of morality she has developed in the book to competing theories.
Early on McMahon is clear to distinguish the inherently subjective nature of
aesthetic reﬂective judgments from simple arbitrariness, or indeterminacy. If
subjective judgments are arbitrary, then the only alternative is objective, absolute
standards; however, the author contends that such standards would be “doomed to
failure from the outset” (p. 6). Kant’s concept of sensus communis offers an alternative. Substantive universal judgments are not arbitrary as they depend upon the
tastes of the community.
The book centers on the connections between community, language, aesthetic
and moral judgements, concluding that the latter shake out from the former. The
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book is divided into roughly two parts, with the ﬁrst few chapters concerned with
outlining a non-arbitrary subjectivist account of aesthetics, and the latter chapters
concerned with tying moral and practical analysis to aesthetic analysis. Throughout the work McMahon discusses several pieces of contemporary artwork and
people’s aesthetic reactions to these pieces, accompanied by a grayscale depiction
of the referenced work of art, as a means to illustrate certain positions she takes.
Although it may initially appear a petty criticism, I believe that the choice to
depict the referenced art in this way – in black and white and static – is a mistake.
Color photographs and videos of this art can be easily found by internet search
engines, but the choice to depict this art in black and white undercuts the kind
of aesthetic experience the author is concerned with conveying. Furthermore,
some cases – for example the discussion surrounding the ﬁrst ﬁgure, Olafur
Eliasson’s The Weather Project exhibition – would be better shown not only in
color photograph, but in motion. These pieces of art, and the discussion surrounding them, serve to illustrate central concepts of McMahon’s theory, but are
presented in a way that gives the audience a different experience than the ones
discussed. The subjective, ﬁrst-hand experience of viewing this art is uncontroversially and inevitably distinct from viewing it in this context, but this strife seems
like it could have been mitigated by choosing different artistic works or presenting
the material in color.
This illustrates what I think is the work’s greatest ﬂaw – for the best understanding of McMahon’s project, one must come to the table with a rather unique,
robust artistic, philosophical and scientiﬁc background. The author has a propensity to ‘tell’ rather than ‘show’, the normal reader is told that The Weather Project
is perceived differently, but lacks the same ﬁrst-hand experience to compare it to.
A reader with the same artistic background would be more familiar with the
exhibit and, perhaps, more surprised to ﬁnd others interpret it so differently.
McMahon has a robust grasp on contemporary philosophical and scientiﬁc
theories concerning aspects of aesthetics, human communities and human
psychology, but has a bad habit of referring to conclusions of works in various
ﬁelds without explaining how these conclusions were arrived at, or whether they
are controversial. There is, it seems, little debate; but rather a single-continuous
narrative that supports the author’s interpretation of character and role of aesthetic
judgment as the subjective, culturally dependent foundation of our moral capacity.
For example, early in Chapter 5, McMahon dispassionately, and without
citation, contends that “There are certain dispositions hardwired into developmental stages, where, for example, at around age ten to twelve, the child switches
allegiance from caregivers to peers” (p. 104). As we mature, she claims, we have
some choice in with whom we choose to cooperate. She goes on to argue that
our aesthetic reﬂective judgments and our moral judgments presuppose community
and are partially determined by that community.
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Freedom and determinism are two highly contentious topics in the free will
debate; since Aristotle, moral philosophers have contended that moral agency
and responsibility requires control, but disagreed about what kind of control is
necessary. Yet the lack of control children are said to have about this intimate,
character-setting aspect of their development is striking. If McMahon is right, then
our allegiance – what we ﬁnd morally compelling – is, at least in some situations,
completely outside our control, and in the best of situations, partially determined
by the beliefs and attitudes of others.
For McMahon, community plays a vital role in determining morality; she
contends that Kant “acknowledges the role of endorsement by a community”, in
achieving a normatively valid judgment (p. 106). One way is to treat community
endorsement as a litmus test for a proposition – if a moral, aesthetic, or empirical
position is endorsed by the community, setting aside the possibility of radical error,
this is evidence of its truth (or, at least, practicality). Alternatively, McMahon might
be opting for a cultural relativist interpretation of Kant, such that morality is – at
least in part – determined by the approval or disapproval of one’s community. This
interpretation seems at odds with Kant’s notion of morality as giving one’s self
moral rules; such rules would not only need to be internally consistent, but satisfy
the community one identiﬁes with, such that the categorical imperative might yield
different results depending upon to what community one chooses allegiance.
McMahon shines an important light on the connection between rationality and
morality and the inherently subjective nature of our aesthetic judgments for Kant,
and how this relates to several notable philosophers that have followed. The work
tackles numerous controversial and important topics in ethics and aesthetics in a
thorough, but somewhat inaccessible way. In this respect, it is an important work
source for academics working in aesthetics and moral philosophy, but one that is
largely – and regrettably – inaccessible to those of different backgrounds.
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